The symbolic management literature explores loose coupling between substantive and symbolic aspects of organizational activities. The prior literature, however, focuses on the benefits of symbolic management and tends to treat it as costless. If symbolic management is costless, presumably all firms should pursue it, yet in practice they do not. In this paper, we extend the theory of symbolic management to incorporate its costs as well as its benefits. We explore the gap between symbolic and substantive actions by creating a novel data set that combines information on claimed reductions with actual greenhouse gas emissions reductions calculated from fuel use data for the US electric utility industry. This approach goes beyond the implicit assumption of the complete decoupling of substantive and symbolic action made in prior work on symbolic management.
might withhold information about many negative outcomes for each positive outcome it chooses to disclose. Despite the appeal of selective disclosure as a device for understanding loose coupling, it has received very little attention in the prior literature.
Often, it is difficult or impossible to examine to what extent corporate claims are truthful or to what extent these claims are representative of their overall activity. We overcome this challenge by employing greenhouse gas emissions data from the US electric utility industry. Electric utility companies operating in the US must truthfully report their detailed fuel use data to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) by filling out FERC Form 1. Because no end-of-pipe technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is yet in use, what goes in, comes out. Thus, by making use of data on the carbon content of each fuel source, actual greenhouse gas emissions and reductions can be calculated from fuel use data. Sources for self-claimed data abound, including companies' websites, annual reports, or sustainability reports. We use a more uniform channel through which companies voluntarily report their greenhouse gas reductions: the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)'s voluntary program for reporting reductions of greenhouse gases (also known as 1605(b) program). As will be explained in more detail later, this program, although formalized through the DOE, provides ample room for flexibility. Thus, by comparing firms' claimed and actual reductions in emissions, this paper is able to offer keen insights into the relationship between symbolic and substantive action.
Disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions by companies provides a natural setting in which to study the costs of symbolic management and the extent of decoupling between symbolic and substantive action. In the face of growing pressure from external stakeholders, an increasing number of companies publicize their greenhouse gas reduction efforts, yet it is often unclear how substantial these efforts are within the context of the firm's overall strategy. In addition, some stakeholder groups are highly sensitive to greenwashing by large corporations, creating potential costs for firms that make misleading claims. Our data are of particular interest because they allow us to go beyond treating symbolic and substantive action as an all-or-nothing choice. We are able to assess the magnitude of the gap between what companies say about emissions reductions and what they actually do, to identify the factors influencing its magnitude and to consider the possibility that this gap might even be negative in some cases.
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SYMBOLIC MANAGEMENT
Institutional theorists have long argued that organizations that appear responsive to pressures from their external environment, which are often voiced by significant external stakeholders, increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001 ).
The benefits of symbolic management in fashioning such responses have been well documented in the literature. For example, Westphal and Zajac (1998) find that corporate announcement of long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) for CEOs, a widely institutionalized practice, was valued positively by investors, even when a careful reading of a firm's proxy statement would have revealed that the firm did not actually announce the granting of any performance-related CEO compensation. Furthermore, Zajac and Westphal (2004) show that corporate announcement of the planned adoption of stock repurchase plans was greeted positively by investors, even as a growing number of firms failed to follow through on such announcements or on LTIP announcements, and even if the firm itself had a history of announcing stock repurchase plans or LTIPs that it had failed to act upon. In a similar vein, there is a growing body of evidence that firms participating in industry-led or governmentsponsored environmental programs perform no better than non-participants (King and Lenox 2000; Rivera and DeLeon 2004; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010) . Thus, if firms can get away with merely symbolic (and hence costless) actions, they can appropriate the benefits that would properly accrue only to firms that took substantive action.
The costs of symbolic management have received much less attention. Emphasizing selective disclosure as an important and flexible tool for symbolic management (Pfeffer, 1981) , we identify two types of potential costs of symbolic management. Specifically, we argue that symbolic actions involve costs that arise from both within organizations and outside organizations. Within organizations, there may be signaling costs associated with engaging in symbolic management (Spence, 1973) if at least a modicum of substantive action is required before a firm has any positive outcomes to disclose. Outside organizations, there may exist stakeholders who oppose the practice of symbolic management, and thus symbolic management may backfire. In this paper, we explore both possibilities.
From the internal perspective, signaling costs may be required if the firm is to credibly convey information about itself to the intended audience. In Spence (1973) 's jobmarket signaling example, a job market candidate sends a signal about her ability level to the potential employer by acquiring an educational credential. The informational value of the credential comes from the fact that the employer assumes it is positively correlated with greater individual ability. The job market candidate thus incurs the cost of obtaining the credential. Similarly, we posit that to be able to engage in symbolic management in a credible manner, organizations may need to incur some costs. In the context of this paper, organizations may have to achieve some level of greenhouse gas reductions to convincingly publicize that they are reducing their carbon footprints.
From the external perspective, we theorize that as organizations come under increasing scrutiny, complete decoupling between symbolic and substantive action becomes increasingly risky, since symbolic actions with no basis may be exposed and punished by one or more stakeholder groups. In such circumstances, firms may prefer to make selective disclosures of favorable substantive actions, rather than making claims that lack any substantive foundation. However, when it becomes too risky to engage in symbolic management---even via truthful but selective disclosure---due to increased scrutiny by external stakeholders, firms may choose not to disclose any information at all (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011) .
Indeed, the risks of selective disclosure are highlighted by the increasing denunciation by environmental activists and concerned citizens of corporate environmental efforts as PR campaigns. For example, Starbucks Corporation was recently accused of greenwashing for promoting recycling on its cups with the slogan "help us help the planet" on its cup holder sleeves.
1 Although Starbucks uses cups made of 10 percent recycled material, the cups themselves are not recyclable in most cities due to their plastic coating. BP has been heavily criticized for misleading the public with its multimillion-dollar advertising campaign announcing its commitment to alternative energy sources. 2 (BP allocates 93 percent of its total investment funds for the development and extraction of oil, gas and other fossil fuels and less than 5 percent for solar and wind power.) Its claims to social responsibility have meant that BP attracts more attention when it makes mistakes: oil spills at BP were significantly more likely to be reported in the media than equivalent spills at Exxon (Luo et al. 2012) . The Coca-Cola Company came under attack when it announced that the company had cut back its water usage by about 4 percent annually in order to reduce its water footprint. 3 Coke was criticized because its bottlers do not generally disclose how much water they are taking, and hence it is impossible for outsiders to verify the company's claim.
Although the extent to which these campaigns have real negative consequences has not been studied much, 4 these phenomena suggest that not all external constituents avoid inspecting and controlling institutionalized organizations (Meyer, and Rowan, 1977) . Thus, we argue that the presence of active external stakeholders such as environmental NGOs creates potential costs of symbolic management originating from the external environment.
EXTENT OF SYMBOLIC MANAGEMENT
Although the prior literature typically treats symbolic management as dichotomous (actions are either symbolic or substantive), in practice firms often have important choices about the extent of symbolic management in which they engage. Selective disclosure, for example, is a useful tactic that allows a firm to choose exactly how much favorable and unfavorable information it releases. The accounting literature has long been concerned with the extent and accuracy of discretionary disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Patten 1991; Patten 1992; Al-3 http://www.polarisinstitute.org/coca_cola_company_wins_corporate_greenwashing_award, Polaris Institute 4 Practitioners find that environmental concerns are important issues to pay attention to not only because of consequences for legitimacy but also because of their implications for firm strategy and financial performance. For example, sales of bottled water recently declined after environmental backlash. Critics claim that bottled water is often just tap-water in a plastic bottle, thus bottled water unnecessarily creates plastic bottle waste. This assertion led dominant players in the industry, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and Nestle, to change their strategies. CocaCola and PepsiCo started to differentiate their products from tap-water by producing flavored or even nutritious water. Coca-Cola introduced a flavored version of Dasani, Dasani Essence, and PepsiCo, owner of Aquafina, launched vitamin-and herb-enhanced SoBe Lifewater. Nestle, owner of Perrier, Poland Spring, and Arrowhead, began to focus more on its low-cost Pure Life. Tuwaijri et al. 2004 ). More recently, stakeholders concerned about corporate reporting flexibility have come together to create the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), which attempts to standardize corporate reporting of environmental, social and governance practices.
Although Pfeffer (1981) noted that selective disclosure can be a useful tool for symbolic management, the subsequent literature has paid little attention to this possibility.
Selective disclosure creates a natural coupling between symbolic and substantive action, since one can only disclose positive outcomes that actually exist. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two can still be loose, since a firm might withhold information about many negative outcomes for each positive outcome it chooses to disclose. Thus, selective disclosure provides a natural means of going beyond the dichotomy between symbolism and substance that has dominated the literature on symbolic management.
Interpreting selective disclosure requires much more sophistication from external stakeholders than does a simple dichotomous signal, such as whether a firm created a longterm incentive plan or joined a government program. Thus, firms may benefit from disclosure that incorporates both a binary decision to issue a corporate sustainability report and a more nuanced decision about exactly what information to include in it. Many stakeholders are likely to be satisfied with observing whether or not the firm issued a report at all because this is easy to monitor, while a minority of stakeholders with greater vested interests may probe further into its details. As we elaborate below, the logic of Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggests that the binary participation decision is likely to be driven by external pressures while the details are likely to be shaped more by actual operational costs and efficiency considerations. Gore's report titled, "Reinventing Environmental Regulation" (Clinton and Gore, 1995) . One of the proposals is to take full advantage of the power of information (Delmas et al. 2007 ). 
THE VOLUNTARY GREENHOUSE GAS REGISTRY

Program Participation
One of the most prominent trends in government regulation over the past two decades is a shift from mandatory rules to voluntary programs (Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Short and Toffel 2010 (Arora and Cason, 1995; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Welch, Mazur, and Bretschneider, 2000 , Rivera and de Leon, 2004 , Sam and Innes, 2005 .
Building on the symbolic management literature, we further identify under what circumstances firms' participation in voluntary programs is more likely to be observed. One reason why symbolic action is possible is that parties in contact with the organization may have unclear or unstable preferences for organizational actions or outcomes (Pfeffer, 1981) .
We argue that this condition is more likely to be met when there is no, or a weak, government mandate; in the context of our paper, this manifests as a lack of binding greenhouse gas regulations. In the US, there is no federal-level mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the electric utility industry. There are, however, state-level regulations that indirectly achieve a similar goal. Some states have adopted renewable portfolio standards, which typically require that a certain percentage of electricity generation comes from renewable sources. The stringency of this regulation varies. We contend that participation in government-initiated voluntary programs with regard to greenhouse gas emissions serves as a cooperative signal to government regulators and thus helps to preempt more stringent greenhouse gas regulations. Indeed, Maxwell et al.(2000) and Hoffman (2005) note that voluntary programs might facilitate preemption or delay of mandatory regulations, and Innes and Sam (2008) find that corporate participation in voluntary programs reduces the likelihood of regulatory enforcement. Thus, we posit that stringent government mandates reduce company incentives to participate in voluntary programs.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of more stringent regulation decreases the likelihood of program participation.
Whereas government as a stakeholder desires to see its own programs as successful, reporting (the primary form of reporting used by program participants), arguing that it allows companies to "cherry pick" the projects they want to report:
"Without full and transparent entity-wide emissions accounting, project-based reporting weakens the system and undermines the value of real reductions by providing opportunities for gaming the system and claiming hypothetical reductions while emissions are actually increasing." (NRDC, p.4) activities open to suspicion and reduce its ability to obtain resources, legitimacy, or social support (Oliver, 1991) . The tension between the government and the NGO perspectives on voluntary programs meant that companies considering participating had to carefully weigh the benefits (in the form of improved regulatory relationships) against the costs (in the form of provoking negative reactions from NGOs). Conflicting institutional pressures for conformity and their impact on organizations have received increasing attention (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Purdy and Gray, 2009; Kraatz and Block, 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; Seo and Creed, 2002; Oliver, 1991) . If external constituents avoid inspecting and controlling institutionalized organizations, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested, selective disclosure can be an acceptable compromise on competing objectives and expectations (Oliver, 1991) .
Selective disclosure can be especially useful if organizations can choose a more amicable venue, in which otherwise dubious activities appear unusually desirable, proper, or appropriate (Suchman, 1995) .
We argue, however, that in the presence of external stakeholders whose incentives are not well aligned with those of the organization (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005), the probability of being monitored and inspected goes up, and selective disclosure becomes a less useful tool to satisfy conflicting demands. Especially if there is no strong resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
Mode of Reporting
The Voluntary Reporting Program gave companies extraordinary flexibility in reporting mode, with the two most prominent options being project-level reporting and entity-level reporting. Theoretically, project-level reporting allows for selective disclosure of successful emissions reductions projects, such as increasing the availability factor of a nuclear power plant or planting trees. Entity-level reporting requires disclosure of a firm's entire emissions footprint, which is affected by the firm's existing generation mix and its rate of demand growth. As a result, growing companies have incentives to report at the project level so as to present a more favorable overall depiction of the firm's performance. Thus we have
Hypothesis 3: A firm is more likely to report at the project level if it is growing.
Rational calculations of the benefits of claiming greater emissions may not be the only factor affecting a company's choice of reporting mode. When faced with a new business activity such as greenhouse gas reporting, firms may turn to trade associations or other business networks for ideas on how to operate. This can be especially so when there are conflicting demands from external stakeholders. As discussed earlier, with difficulties enacting greenhouse gas legislation and with increasing costs of regulation, governments 
Extent of Disclosure
In addition to the participation decision, companies had a choice about the extent to which they would report their emissions footprints. They could report their full footprint, overstate their reductions by reporting only on successful projects, or possibly even understate reductions. As mentioned above, environmental activists were concerned that the program made it easy for a company to overstate its emissions reductions relative to changes in its actual emissions footprint. We posit that the extent of disclosure was affected by a different set of factors than the participation decision, with external pressures less important and internal costs more important. This is because participation in the program is easy to verify, and hence external stakeholders are likely to focus on this decision. Furthermore, because the operational costs of participating in the program are low, internal costs are unlikely to play a critical role in the participation decision.
In contrast, external stakeholders had a much harder time assessing the extent to which disclosure was complete, so were less likely to monitor it. Furthermore, achieving actual emissions reductions that can be disclosed to the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry required real costs, which were increasing in the level of reductions. The most tangible potential benefit from claiming a greater level of emissions reductions was the possibility that participants would receive more early reduction credits (ERCs), which might have significant value if the U.S. eventually creates a tradable permits scheme for greenhouse gas emissions (Michaelowa and Rolfe 2001 , Kennedy 2002 , Parry and Toman 2002 . In particular, participants would benefit if the government adopted an allocation scheme for permits that would award them free permits for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions made prior to the beginning of the trading scheme. In fact, just such a proposal was introduced by We expect the extent of disclosure to depend upon the associated benefits and costs to the reporting firm. In discussing the extent of disclosure, we focus on the difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, normalized by the firm's level of reported reductions; that is, we focus on the extent of exaggeration by the firm. Note that a firm may also understate its reductions, in which case the difference between reported and actual reductions is negative. If the firm reports its full emissions footprint (i.e., by choosing to report on an entire entity basis) then the extent of exaggeration should be 0%. The more rapidly a firm is growing, the larger is the difference between reported and actual emissions reductions, both on an absolute basis, and normalized for the firm's reported (D-DE) , Collins (R-ME), Baucus (D-MT), and Voinovich (R-OH) introduced S. 547, the "Credit for Voluntary Reductions Act." 9 We take this approach because A can be negative. Negative actual reductions mean net emissions increased over time.
level of reductions. Let G denote the growth in emissions due to exogenous growth in demand. Then A = R -G and we can re-write G X R  Thus, we posit that growing firms are likely to have a larger difference between reported and actual reductions, which can be interpreted as an attempt to protect their accomplishments (Suchman, 1995) in the form of establishing claims to early reduction credits.
Hypothesis 5: Growing firms are likely to exhibit a larger gap between reported and actual reductions.
We further theorize that organizations are heterogeneous in terms of their costs of undertaking substantive action. This in turn implies that they vary in their costs of engaging in symbolic action via selective disclosure, since they must achieve a positive outcome that can be selectively disclosed. Firms with low-cost abatement opportunities can more readily engage in substantive action, and therefore are likely to have a larger number of positive emissions reduction outcomes that can be disclosed. Firms without such options may only be able to produce small successes, leaving them little to highlight in public relations releases.
Thus, firms with low-cost options for emissions reduction are likely to have more reductions, and for any growth rate this greater level of reductions implies a smaller normalized difference between reported and actual reductions.
10 Hence, we expect firms with low-cost 10 From the definition of X, we obtain dX/dR = -G/R 2 . Thus, as reported reductions R increase, the normalized difference X decreases. reduction opportunities to be more active in pursuing ERCs, and, in turn, to have a lower normalized difference between reported and actual emissions. 
METHOD Data
We tested our hypotheses using 83 US investor-owned electric utility data over the period 1996-2003. The total number of firm-year observations in the sample is 699. The 1605(b) participation data were collected from the DOE's Voluntary Registry website.
11 Financial, operational and environmental performance-related data were obtained from Platts, a company specializing in energy industry data.
12 Table I provides a list of variables used in this paper and their definitions. Some of the variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity concerns.
[ Table 1 about here]
We collected reported greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the program participants from the DOE's Voluntary Registry website. We calculated actual greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the participants and non-participants based on fuel consumption.
We take this approach rather than using direct observations from the continuous emissions (FERC) when the latter two agreed for the most part. In these cases of discrepancies, NRDC used the FERC-based estimates. Fourth, this paper was able to obtain a more complete dataset using the fuel consumption data than would have been possible using the CEMS data alone. In cases where fuel consumption data were not available, this paper supplemented the fuel consumption-based estimates with adjusted CEMS estimates to increase the number of observations.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for the participation regressions is a dummy variable that indicates participation in the 1605(b) program. The dependent variable for the mode of participation regression is whether the IOUs participated at the project or non-project level. As shown in Table 2 , some electric providers participated only at the project level while others participated at the entity level or both at the project and entity levels. Since there were only a small number of entity level-only participants, and entity level reductions were often the sum of project level reductions for those which participated at both levels, we consider them to be similar to each other than to project-level participants. The dependent variable for the extent of disclosure is the exaggeration index, i.e., ((reported reduction -actual reduction) / reported reduction).
This paper uses probit models to test the hypotheses related to participation in the 1605(b) program and OLS models to test the hypotheses related to mode of participation and the extent of disclosure. For mode of participation, OLS models are equivalent to linear probability models. The linear probability model has been justified from a rigorous theoretical perspective for some empirical settings (Heckman and Snyder 1997) . Moreover, when dummy variables indicating group membership are important explanatory variables, logit and probit models cannot estimate the effect of group membership if all members of some groups behave in the same way; linear probability models, however, can estimate group effects in such settings (Caudill 1988) . Since NERC region membership is an important explanatory variable in our estimation of the mode of participation, we utilize the linear probability model. The probit model estimates, which are not shown in the paper, are similar except for NERC region membership. We pool our dataset across years because the 1605(b)
program does not require that the IOUs make any short-or long-term commitment. We use panel-corrected standard errors and t-statistics for statistical inference. We lag independent variables by one year to avoid endogeneity issues.
Independent Variables
Regulatory stringency. There is no federal mandate to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Non-Aligned Stakeholders. We proxy for the presence of external stakeholders whose preferences are not aligned with the organization-what we will call "skeptical NGOs"-using the density of Sierra Club memberships in a given state. The Sierra Club is the largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization in the U.S. Its 1.4 million members work for a safe and healthy community and smart energy solutions to combat global warming among others.
This variable thus represents the strength of environmental groups in the state. Prior research has found that Sierra Club memberships have a significant impact on corporate voluntary environmental practice (Maxwell et al. 2000; Innes and Sam, 2008) . In the context of the electric power industry, Sine and Lee (2009) find that Sierra Club membership had a significant effect on investment in renewables by independent power producers during the early years of renewable energy development. We further posit that Sierra Club members are appalled by corporate reputation building via symbolic management and penalize firms that pursue such practices. Indeed, some Sierra Club chapters run websites titled "Don't be duped by greenwashing." 14 Also, the Sierra Club, along with Greenpeace, recently attacked greenwash ads from the oil sands industry.
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Growth in generation. Utilities with growing demand have several ways to reduce their carbon intensity, i.e., carbon emissions per unit of generation. For example, growing firms can increase their capacity factors, thereby making operations more efficient. Growing companies can also justify building new power plants, which during our sample period tended to be relatively low-emission gas-fired plants; adding new, clean capacity reduces a firm's overall carbon intensity. 16 The opportunity to reduce its carbon intensity, however, does not mean that a firm's carbon emissions will decline, because increased electricity generation will lead to increased emissions unless new and cleaner power plants replace old and dirty power plants. Accordingly, growing companies have several projects to pursue, but, holding everything else constant, their total carbon emissions are likely to increase over time.
Growth in generation is calculated as growth at the utility level relative to year t-1.
Common business networks. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
is the electric reliability organization certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to establish and enforce reliability standards for the North American bulk power system. Council (WECC). The primary goal of the NERC regional entities is to improve the reliability of the bulk power system, but they also share common goals with regard to the business environment, for example, proposed and actual changes in applicable laws and regulations including environmental and other issues. 17 Thus, we use the NERC region dummy variables to capture a tendency for firms in the same network to behave similarly towards environmental issues-more specifically, to use the same reporting modes in participating in the voluntary greenhouse gas registry.
Low-cost emissions reduction opportunities. Utilities with low-cost opportunities for
emissions reductions are likely to pursue more projects. This paper includes several variables designed to capture the presence of low-cost opportunities. Firms with inefficient fossil fuelburning plants that could benefit from a retrofit (proxied for by a high heat rate, or heat input per unit of electricity generated) may be able to lower emissions at low cost. Firms that are currently operating at low capacity factors may be able to improve efficiency by better allocating generation across plants. Firms with hydro and nuclear plants may have low-cost opportunities to reduce emissions through uprating of power plants' capacity. Low-cost opportunities also include firms with high-cost oil-burning plants that could be displaced by cheaper and cleaner gas-fired generating units. We create a variable called "fuel switch saving" that measures the difference between the cost per kwh of the firm's most expensive fuel source and the cost per kwh of natural gas.
Control Variables
In addition to the foregoing variables, we include a set of control variables to reflect important dimensions of firm heterogeneity that may affect participation and the extent of disclosure. We control for firm size, since larger companies are more visible, and hence likely to face greater pressure from a variety of stakeholders to take action. In addition, they may enjoy economies of scale in compliance, or have better access to capital markets and hence lower costs of new investments. 18 We also control for the level and intensity of greenhouse gas emissions, since dirtier firms are likely to face greater media scrutiny and pressure from external stakeholders. 19 In addition, we control for voting records of congressional delegations in each state on environmental issues. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in our analysis along the correlations between each of the variables.
RESULTS
[ Table 2 about here]
Most correlations are relatively low. However, not surprisingly, there are significant positive correlations between operating revenues and CO 2 emissions and between House and Senate LCV scores. As shown in the result tables, using CO 2 emissions and CO 2 emissions 18 Large firms were more likely to participate in the EPA's 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 1995; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Sam and Innes, 2005) , the EPA's Green Lights program (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 2000) , the EPA's WasteWi$e program (Videras and Alberini, 2000) , the DOE's Climate Challenge program (Karamanos, 1999; Welch, Mazur, and Bretschneider, 2000) , and the Sustainable Slopes Program (Rivera and de Leon, 2004) . 19 Dirtier firms were found to be more likely to participate in the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 1995; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Sam and Innes, 2005) , the Green Lights program (Videras and Alberini, 2000) , the Climate Challenge Program (Karamanos, 1999), the Sustainable Slopes Program (Rivera and de Leon, 2004 ) and the WasteWi$e program (Videras and Alberini, 2000) .
intensity interchangeably does not change regression results significantly. Also, using the average of House and Senate LCV scores instead does not change the results qualitatively. The vast bulk of companies that participated in the 1605b program opt to report only at the project level (48%) or at both the project and the entity level (46%), with only 6%
reporting at the entity level only. Selective disclosure is clearly an important mode of participating in the 1605(b) program. In our empirical analysis to follow, we focus on the firm's choice between reporting at the project level or at the entity level (either entity-only or both project-and entity-level). We turn now to examining the drivers of participation, participation mode, and the extent of disclosure. Figure 2 shows the extent of disclosure for firms participating in the 1605b program.
[ Figure 2 about here]
As expected, a greater majority of firms reported selectively, i.e., over reported their greenhouse gas reductions. Surprisingly, however, some firms under reported their greenhouse gas reductions. Based solely on the economic motivation to pursue early reduction credits, it is impossible to understand why firms would ever under report their greenhouse gas reductions. We explore this phenomenon further in the extent of disclosure section below. Table 3 shows what factors motivate firms to participate in the 1605(b) program.
Participation
[ Consistent with prior research, we find that larger firms and firms with greater emissions are more likely to participate in the voluntary greenhouse gas registry program. Table 4 shows what factors determine the mode of participation.
Participation mode
[ Table 4 about here]
We do not find support for hypothesis 3 that a firm is more likely to report selectively if it is growing. This could be partly due to the flexible nature of the voluntary greenhouse gas registry program. Even those who report at the entity level could flexibly choose the boundary of their emissions; thus, reporting at the project level might have not been critical.
The flexibility allowed in the program might also explain why the carbon emissions variable is negatively associated with the dependent variable, which takes a value of 1 if project-level participation and 0 otherwise. By reporting at the entity or both levels while not being strict about the definition of entity, firms with large emissions might be able to look cleaner than it really is.
Consistent with hypothesis 4, we find that firms in common business networks are more likely to adopt similar reporting practices. The pressure to follow a normative practice in their business network clearly played a significant role, especially when the voluntary greenhouse gas registry allowed ample flexibility.
Extent of disclosure
Next we examine what drives the extent of disclosure. Table 5 shows regression results using
OLS, and Table 6 shows regression results using NERC regions as instruments. The results are qualitatively similar.
[ Table 5 about here]
[ Table 6 about here]
We find support for hypothesis 5 that growing firms are likely to exhibit a greater gap between reported and actual reductions. For growing companies, unless low-emitting sources replace high-emitting ones, net emissions are likely to increase over time. If these growing firms engage in selective disclosure, then the Exaggeration Index will increase as a result.
We find limited support for hypothesis 6 that firms with low-cost emission reduction opportunities are likely to exhibit a smaller gap between reported and actual reductions. Most variables we use to proxy for low-cost opportunities are not consistently significant across alternative models with the exception of the capacity factor variable. As expected, low (high) capacity factor is associated with a (smaller) larger Exaggeration Index. Firms with power plants operating at low capacity can increase their capacity factor, while more efficiently utilizing their power plants. Contrary to our expectations, greater potential savings from fuel switching are positively associated with the Exaggeration Index in most cases. It appears that firms do not make much use of fuel switching to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, this variable may just capture the extent to which firms rely on more heavily polluting oil than cleaner natural gas as a fuel source. As shown by the CO 2 emissions variable, more polluting firms are associated with higher measures of the Exaggeration Index, perhaps to appear less polluting than they really are. These findings suggest that external pressures play an important role not only in the participation stage, but also in influencing firm decisions regarding the extent to which they will disclose their emissions reductions.
Interestingly, project or non-project level participation does not affect the extent of disclosure. This could be because of two factors. First, as discussed earlier, firms could choose the boundary of their entity when reporting their emissions at the entity level.
Personal correspondence with the manager of the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry revealed that allowing flexibility in how firms define their entity-level emissions was one of the many lenient features of the program to encourage wide industry participation. For example, firms were allowed to report entity-level reductions just as the sum of project-level reductions. Second, firms tended to choose their reporting mode based on what is considered a norm in their business network instead of making a strategic choice based, for example, on their emissions growth over time. Under the latter circumstances, the pressure to follow a normative practice might outweigh economic motivations to pursue early reduction credits, and it is possible that firms, especially shrinking ones, under report their emissions reductions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have provided a close up look at the mechanisms of symbolic management by providing an unusually sharp comparison of firms' symbolic actions (environmental disclosures) with their substantive actions (actual environmental performance). We reached two broad conclusions. First, we find that a majority of firms engage in loose coupling between symbolic and substantive action, rather than complete decoupling, disclosing favorable information but withholding information that is not favorable to them. This strongly supports Pfeffer's (1981) contention that selective release of information is an important mechanism for the practice of symbolic management, although it has been ignored in most subsequent literature. Second, we extend the literature on symbolic management by showing that the costs of symbolic management matter. Potential external costs, i.e., that symbolic management via selective disclosure may be monitored and punished, discouraged firms from participating in the Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry Program. In addition, the internal costs firms must incur to manage their greenhouse gas footprint have significant effects on the extent of deviation between reported and actual reductions. Technically, only those firms that exaggerate their environmental achievements should be thought of as engaging in symbolic management. Our results, however, suggest that skeptical external stakeholders tend to view participation in voluntary programs per se as indicative of symbolic management. This is probably because participation is easy to monitor whereas investigating the difference between symbolic and substantive actions is a costly process.
The findings of our paper also suggest how government, typically thought of as an enforcer of legal requirements upon organizations, might facilitate symbolic management by firms. When there is not a political majority to support legislation, governments often make use of voluntary programs instead. Voluntary programs can achieve some improvements over the status quo without incurring significant costs either for government itself or for the participating firms. Governments may thus have incentives to adopt lax rules to encourage private sector participation and to demonstrate that their programs work. This in turn supports the notion that symbolic management practices may be facilitated by implicitly cooperative external stakeholders. 
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Perhaps the most significant change in the Voluntary Reporting Program is that the revised guidelines place greater emphasis on entity-wide reporting. Large emitters interested in not just "reporting" reductions, but also formally "registering" them must submit entitywide emission inventories. 24 To the extent that "registered" reductions are more likely to be granted early reduction credits (ERCs), 25 this change in reporting rules discourages companies from the selective reporting of good news.
Electric utility companies fought hard against requiring entity-wide inventories for registering reductions. including (p. 7) "the recordation of transferable credit, baseline protection and credit for past actions" and "public relations material and releases and annual reports." The bulk of the EEI comments were oriented towards transferable credits, though, and EEI reluctantly admitted that (p. 7) "If the purpose is to obtain transferable credits…the reporting under the revised guidelines may need to be more rigorous in the criteria to be applied…" Even then, however, it maintained that (p. 7) "these criteria should not, and need not, be dependent on entity-wide reporting."
The EEI gives a hypothetical example (pp. 4-5) that crystallizes its views. It posits a predominantly nuclear-fueled utility whose sales grow over a decade from 32.6 terawatthours (TWH) to 35.7 TWH, and whose carbon emissions increase from 12.3 to 13.6 million tons.
The utility meets the new demand with natural gas, and undertakes two other "projects": a decrease in the heat rate of a coal plant, and a demand-side management program to reduce peak demand; its overall carbon intensity is unchanged. The firm's aggregate GHG emissions have risen by about 10%, however. The EEI complains that "Under an approach where transferable credits could only be earned for absolute reductions in entity-wide emissions, this utility would receive no credits…However, in examining this utility's actions more closely, one sees that it provided real emissions reductions. As a result, it would need to be able to report at a project level in order to receive credit for the two actions that do make such contributions."
The EEI example perfectly mirrors our empirical results. The firm faces increasing demand, and increases its aggregate carbon emissions over time. Nevertheless, it wants to obtain early reduction credits, so it participates in 1605(b) in order to highlight two individual projects, while electing not to report on the 1.3 million ton increase in its overall GHG emissions.
In opposition to EEI, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an environmental NGO, condemned project-level reporting, arguing that it is unnecessary if companies are required to disclose changes in their overall carbon footprint:
"While companies report their entity-wide emissions, there is no reason to continue providing for a separate registry on a project basis, since any legitimate project-based activity is automatically incorporated in company-wide totals and will show up as part of the firm's changes in total emissions from year to year." (NRDC, p.4) 3
After considering both points of view, DOE voiced a similar rationale for why it finally decided to require entity-wide registration under the revised guidelines:
"…Because most large companies and institutions regularly take actions that have as one of their effects the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, there are always many candidates for project-based emission reductions. But the net effect of such projectbased reductions on an entity's total emissions is often questioned, because large entities may be taking actions that reduce emissions, while simultaneously taking other actions that increase emissions. Furthermore, it is impossible to evaluate the significance of a particular entity's actions to reduce emissions unless the total emissions of that entity are known." (DOE, p.19) 26 In the end, the utilities lost in their bid to retain the extraordinary flexibility of the original reporting system. The resolution to this heated debate---entity-wide reporting for registering reductions---makes it much more difficult for 1605(b) participants to obtain early reduction credits while increasing their overall GHG emissions. It also reinforces the argument that the 1605(b) program, as originally created, served as a vehicle for corporate greenwash.
Overall, the findings of this paper illustrate potential opportunities in the domain of environmental policy for research on symbolic management. Decoupling tendencies can be 26 DOE, Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, General Guidelines Finalized 04/21/06. manifested in various dimensions of firms' activities. Among them, environmental sustainability provides one of the best possible settings in which to further examine the issue.
Growing concerns over environmental pollution put increasing institutional pressure on firms to take action (Bansal and Roth, 2000) . As institutional theory predicts, many firms respond to institutional pressure by, for example, voluntarily reducing emissions or producing green goods designed for minimum environmental impact. As discussed in the paper, these seemingly righteous actions are often criticized as greenwashing, and we find evidence in support of this claim. Corporate environmental practice then indeed presents an excellent setting to study and to contribute to the broader literature on symbolic management. Revenue from sales of electricity (10 9 $).
Heatrate
The ratio of heat input to net energy generated (Btu/kWh).
Capacity factor
The ratio of energy generated to the maximum that could have been generated. It is calculated by dividing net generation (MWh) by (nameplate capacity (MW)×8760(hours)).
Fraction of hydro and nuclear
The ratio of energy generated from hydro and nuclear units to total energy generated.
LCV scores
The League of Conservation Voters (LCV)'s scorecards for U.S. Senate and House.
RPS index
State Renewable Portfolio Standard index. It is calculated by dividing % goal by the difference between the goal year and the enacted or effective year, whichever comes first.
*** Fuel switch saving Low cost and low carbon fuel switching opportunity (10 6 $). Estimated for the month with the highest generation for the year, this is calculated by ordering generators from lowest to highest cost, and multiplying the amount of oil-based generation times the difference in fuel costs between oil and natural gas if oil-based and natural gas-based generation are adjacent in the dispatch order and the cost of natural gas is lower. Growth in generation (t-1)
Percentage growth relative to year t-1 * Documentation for Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U. S. 2003 S. , EIA (2005 , p. 189. ** An adjustment factor is calculated to convert Platts' CO 2 emissions data to fuel-based CO 2 estimates. The fuel-based estimates are regressed on Platts' reported emissions data and the inverse of the coefficient, 0.7527, is used as an adjustment factor. This aligns well with NRDC's report that continuous emissions monitoring data could be biased upward by 10-30 percent relative to fuel-based estimates. www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rbr/append.asp. 
